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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky marked a turning point in applying the Equal Protection Clause in
criminal jury trials.' Before Batson, the Court never had placed severe
restraints on the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors.4 Within six
years, the Court quickly extended Batson to the civil arena, clearly announcing total intolerance for any kind of racial strikes during jury selection.5
In 1994, the Court decided J.E.B. v. Alabama,6 marking the extension
of not only the Batson test, but also the entire Batson rationale, to genderbased classifications during jury selection.7 The J.E.B. opinion unceremoniously broadens Batson to an entirely new field of play, without critically
reviewing the underlying constitutional doctrines at stake The purpose of

1. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. See Jere W. Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Batson v. Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal ProtectionExtend to Gender?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 289, 292 (1990).
4. Id.
5. Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to ProspectiveJurorswith Disabilities:
Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 312 (1993).
6. 114S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
7. See id. at 1421.
8. See id. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that extending Batson will burden the entire justice system).
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this Note is to provide a more complete framework for the J.E.B. opinion
by analyzing those fundamental doctrines, and suggesting a conclusion to
J.E.B. more faithful to the Court's teachings.
Part II begins this analysis by reviewing the history, tradition, and
purpose of peremptory challenges in both the English and American systems of justice. Part IR continues examining peremptory challenges, focusing on the Court's previous efforts to balance carefully equal protection
and peremptory challenges. Part IV presents the final doctrinal inquiry of
the Note by analyzing the Court's treatment of gender-based classifications
through the evolution and application of intermediate scrutiny. Part V
discusses the collision of these doctrines which occurs in J.E.B., and highlights the Court's lack of adherence to its own prior decisions. Part VI

continues the discussion by proposing a solution in J.E.B. more consistent
with two decades of Court opinions and six centuries of legal tradition.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: THE PRE-BATSON LEGACY

A. The Traditions of the Jury and Peremptory Challenges
Trial by jury was first used in actions of trespass in late twelfth century England.9 Until 1305, the King's lawyers were allowed to disqualify
unlimited numbers of jurors simply by invoking the King's name.'" In
1305, Parliament eliminated prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges,
allowing challenges only for cause." Although prosecutors were later allowed to "stand-aside" jurors, prosecutorial use of the peremptory was
gone forever. Criminal defendants, though, still were allowed to exercise
up to thirty-five peremptory challenges' 3 against any juror suspected of
prejudice against them.' 4 Blackstone described the peremptory challenge
9. J.H. BAxER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGUSH LEGAL HISTORY 64 (2d ed. 1979). A trespass
joined in issue by the parties caused the Sheriff to command 12 neighborhood men to inquire in the
matter and state the truth of the facts. Id. The trial by jury of criminal defendants became widespread
after the Church stopped using the "ordeal" to decide cases in 1215. Id. By the 14th century, juries
had begun to take on a judicial character and the trial by facts became firmly separated from the application of law. Id. at 65-66. Before long, the distinction between "law" and "facts" became a principle
sacred to generations of Englishmen that they should be judged by their peers, and not by meddling
judges. Id. at 66.
10. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1990).
11. Id.

12. Id. at 10. Colbert describes the "stand-aside" as "distinguishable from the peremptory challenge in one important respect a juror directed to 'stand-aside' may eventually be selected to serve on
the jury; a juror peremptorily stricken is permanently excused and disqualified" Id. at 10 n.34. If jury
selection could not be completed because too many jurors had been stricken by the defendant, or because of too many "stand-asides," jurors would then be selected from the "stand-aside" pool. Id.
13. Deborah Zalesne & Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of McCollum, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 313, 317 n.16 (1993).
14. Colbert, supra note 10, at 9 (quoting J. PROFATr, A TREATISE OF TRIAL BY JURY § 155, at
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as based upon "sudden impressions" and "unaccountable prejudices"
which we are unable to articulate, but still sense from looks and gestures."5
Although the English jury system underwent many subsequent changes
through the eighteenth century, criminal defendants retained the right to
peremptories based on two rationales. 16 First, the Crown had inherent advantages in criminal proceedings, and peremptories helped to balance the
defendant's position.17 Second, by allowing the defendant to strike jurors
without cause, jury verdicts appeared more legitimate and worthy of respect."
This legacy of the peremptory challenge found continued life in the
American colonies, and persisted after independence from England. 9 In
1865, Congress voted to allow prosecutors a limited number of
peremptories in federal criminal trials.2" Advocates argued that the challenges were necessary to combat jury sympathy for defendants. 2 Today,
prosecutorial peremptories remain in the federal courts,22 and have existed in every state since 1919.23 Although the Supreme Court held in
Stilson v. United States24 that peremptory challenges were not constitutionally guaranteed,-' the endurance and widespread application of

210-11 (1877)).
15. Colbert, supra note 10, at 10 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 346-47 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1772)). Blackstone further wrote that the peremptory challenge had survived because of a sense of "tenderness and humanity to prisoners .... [A]
prisoner... should have a good opinion of his jury.... [Tihe law wills not that he should be tried by
any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason
for such his dislike." Id.
16. Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 317.
17. Id.The Crown's greatest advantage was that agents of the King controlled the larger panel of
potential jurors from which the petit jury was drawn. Id.
18. Id.at318.
19. Id. at 318-19. Although the final draft of the Sixth Amendment did not mention use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors or defendants, Congress codified the common-law rule in 1790,
providing peremptory challenges to defendants, but not to prosecutors. Colbert, supra note 10, at 1011.
20. Colbert, supra note 10, at I I & n.38 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500).
In capital and treason cases, the prosecution received five peremptory challenges, and the defense received 20. Id.In noncapital felonies, the prosecution received two challenges, and the defense 10. Id.
21. Id.at 11-12.
22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
23. See Colbert, supra note 10, at 11 n.39. Given the facts surrounding J.E.B. v.Alabama, see
infra text accompanying notes 228-32, it is somewhat ironic that Alabama was the first state to approve a prosecutor's peremptory challenge law in 1820. Colbert, supra note 10, at 11 n.39.
24. 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
25. Id.at 586. The Court upheld a lower court conviction of two defendants under the Espionage
Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version in scattered sections of 18, 22, and 50 U.S.C. (1988)).
Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586. Writing for the Court, Justice Day stated that "[tihere is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants
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peremptories stand as a testament to their continuing value and utility.'
B. The Traditions of Jury, Peremptories,and Discrimination
Strauder v. West Virginia27 represents the Supreme Court's first attack on discrimination in jury selection using the Equal Protection
CMause2 The West Virginia statute at issue provided that only white
males could serve as jurors2 Although the Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court's

opinion did not address the use of the peremptory challenge." As a result, both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory uses of peremptories were
allowed to continue, including race-based jury exclusions.32 Although the
purpose of the peremptory challenge was for the protection and peace of
mind of defendants as well as the public at large,33 unfettered use of
peremptories was clearly in conflict with the very purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause.34 Still, it was eighty-five years before the Court addressed the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama35 in 1965.

Swain, a young black man, argued that his conviction for the rape of a
white woman violated the Equal Protection Clause because the prosecutor
had struck all six black venire members.36 Even though the Court was
aware that peremptory challenges could be applied for discriminatory
purposes, it was unwilling to sacrifice peremptories because of imperfec-

in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured." Id.
26. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 323 n.53.
29. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
30. Id. at 310.
31. See id.
32. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 231 (1965) (quoting the 1961 report of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, which concluded that "[tihe practice of racial exclusion from
juries persists today even though it has long stood indicted as a serious violation of the 14th
amendment [sic]").
33. Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 317-18.
34. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07. The Strauder Court leaned heavily upon the language of
the Slaughter-House Cases in arriving at its conclusion. See id. The Court had held in SlaughterHouse that
[n]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in... all [the
amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have
been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.
In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872).
35. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), modified, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36. Id. at 203, 209-10.
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tions in their use. 7 In fact, the Court placed great weight on the history
and purpose of peremptory challenges. 8 The Court concluded that peremptory challenges served important purposes in a pluralistic society and
by definition were to be used without justification.39 In the end, the
Swain Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited prosecutors
from using peremptories to systematically exclude prospective jurors from
the petit jury based on their race.'
The Swain majority defined "systematic exclusion" as requiring the
defendant to demonstrate that the prosecutor had engaged in race-based
exclusions in many cases.4 Because Swain could not meet this burden,
his conviction was upheld.42 To the dissent, requiring a showing of systematic exclusion imposed "substantial additional burdens" upon the objecting party.43 The Supreme Court would later describe this requirement
as "a crippling burden of proof.""
In the years following Swain, courts and commentators largely condemned the decision.45 Some criticized the seemingly impossible standard
that the Court established, others denounced the Court's endorsement that
group affiliations interfere with jurors' impartiality, and many condemned
the implicit exultation of peremptory challenges over equal protection. '
Although the Swain Court held that the Equal Protection Clause out-

37. Id. at 209.
38. Id. at 220 ("The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."); id. at 221-22
("To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards
of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory .. ").The majority concluded that
[i]n
the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a
pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the
Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his
challenges in any given case.
Id. at 222.
39. Id. at 220, 222.
40. Id. at 223-24.
41. See id.; Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,6 (1992).
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224, 228.
43. Id. at 242 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
44. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
45. Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 369, 387 (1992).
46. Id. Swain also was frequently criticized because the burden of proving purposeful discrimination was virtually impossible, as few jurisdictions maintained records of how a given prosecutor had
used peremptory challenges in other cases. Id. Requiring a showing of systematic exclusion also turned
on the fortuity of whether a defendant was among the first or the last victims of a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id.
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weighed peremptory challenges,47 the Court also recognized the great
value of peremptory challenges and hesitated to deprive litigants of the
right to reject biased jurors.' More than twenty years elapsed before the
Court again addressed the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky.49
Ill. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY
A. Batson v. Kentucky
Batson had been indicted for second-degree burglary and receipt of
stolen goods5 At trial, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
strike all four black venirepersons.51 When Batson's counsel objected on
the basis that Batson also was black, the Court answered that parties were
allowed to use peremptory challenges in any way they desired5 The resulting all-white jury convicted Batson on both charges 3
In deciding Batson, the Court fashioned a test clearly rejecting Swain's
systematic exclusion standard5 4 Where Swain required the defendant to
establish a pattern of racially-discriminatory peremptory challenges over
many cases, Batson redirected the inquiry to the case at hand. 6 First,
the defendant must show membership in a cognizable racial group.' Second, the defendant must show that the prosecutor struck members of the
defendant's racial group during voir dire5 Third, the facts and other relevant indicators must raise an inference of racial discrimination by the
prosecutor. 9
After the defendant establishes this prima facie case of discrimination,

47. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
48. Id. at 221-22.
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. Id. at 82.
51. Id. at 83.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 92-93.
55. See id. at 91-92 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 223).
56. Id. at 95. In refocusing the inquiry to the case at hand, the Batson majority explained that the
idea that several must suffer discrimination before one can object was inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 96. The Court also noted that decisions under Title VII recognized the capacity of plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by relying solely on the facts of their case. Id. at 96
nn.18-19 (discussing cases of disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17)).
57. Id. at 96. The Court stated that defendants are "entitled" to rely upon the fact that peremptory
challenges are a jury practice which give those with a mind to discriminate an opportunity to discriminate. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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the burden shifts to the prosecutor to establish a neutral explanation for
dismissing black jurors.'e Although the explanation need not reach the
standard of a challenge for cause, any challenge exercised due to racebased assumptions fails.6' In supporting its decision, the Batson Court
discussed how racial discrimination in jury selection harms the accused
and undermines public confidence in the justice system.62 The Court also
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of ending governmental discrimination against blacks necessitated this encroachment on peremptory challenges.63
Throughout the majority opinion, the Court was careful not to completely overrule Swain.64 Although the Court rejected Swain's systematic
exclusion test,65 the Court did not argue with Swain's valuation of peremptory challenges.' Instead, the Batson majority continued to embrace
peremptory challenges, noting that peremptories serve in the selection of
impartial juries and contribute to the administration of justice. 7 Thus, the
Court saw the fault in Swain as being the failure to recognize the harm
suffered by defendants because of discrimination.6 8 As such, the Batson
Court was not challenging or disavowing the value of the peremptory
challenge, but the Fourteenth Amendment's command to eliminate racial
discrimination clearly had to take precedence.69
B. "Doctrine Creep": The Post-Batson Expansions
During 1991 and 1992, the Court expanded Batson to the declaration
that all racial strikes would be suspect in jury selection, irrespective of the
case or party involved.7" Of the three cases most expansive of Batson,

60. Id. at 97.
61. Id. at 97-98.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 97-98.
64. Id. at 100 n.25. The footnote stated, "To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama is
contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is overruled." Id. (citation omitted); infra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
65. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96.
66. Id. at 99 n.22. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall wrote that "[t]he decision today will
not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In reply, the majority stated that "[wlhile we respect the views expressed in Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion ... we [do not] think that this historic trial practice, which long has
Id. at 99 n.22.
served the selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished .
67. Id. at 87-88.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 88.
70. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 312-13. Professor Lynch explains that, in the post-Batson expansion cases, the Court was very willing to interpret other legal principles in such a way as to give the
Equal Protection Clause more power and scope in curtailing discriminatory uses of peremptory chal-
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Powers v. Ohio7' set the pace for a broad interpretive framework.'
Therefore, examining the expansion should begin with a look at Powers.
In Powers, a white defendant objected to the prosecutor's exclusion of
black veniremembers. The Court held that a criminal defendant may
object to race-based peremptory challenges, regardless of whether the
defendant and the excluded juror are of the same race.74 The Court conceded that Batson had been premised upon prosecutors removing from the
venire members who shared the same race as the defendant7 Yet, in
fashioning a majority opinion, Justice Kennedy and six others agreed that
criminal defendants have standing to raise the equal protection claims of
excluded jurors.76 In fact, the majority saw the value of participation as a
juror' as rising to the same level of importance as public faith in jury
determinations.7 By focusing on the harm that the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges causes to excluded jurors,7 9 the Court reshaped
Batson from a protection and remedy for defendants to one imbuing to
individual excluded jurors as well."0
During the same term as Powers, the Court also expanded Batson in
deciding Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.8' Although Batson and
Powers were criminal cases, 2 Edmonson extended Batson to the civil
arena.83 To do so, the Court had to find that the actions of civil parties

lenges. Id. at 313.
71. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
72. See Broderick, supra note 45, at 396. Even Judge Broderick, arguing for the complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge, concedes that Powers was a "significant amplification" of the
Batson and Strauderdecisions. See id.
73. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402. Powers, a white man, was indicted in an Ohio court on two counts
of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. Id. In selecting the jury, the
prosecutor used six of nine peremptories to strike blacks from the jury. Id. at 403.
74. Id. at 404.
75. Id. at 406; see supra text accompanying note 52.
76. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
77. Id. at 409.
78. See id. at 411-14. See generally Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 318 (stating that the
peremptory challenge has legitimized the jury system in the public's eyes since its adoption in America).
79. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406.
80. Id. at 409. Justice Kennedy wrote that "[ain individual juror does not have a right to sit on
any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account
of race." Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that Batson required racial identity between the defendant and the excluded jurors. Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
also argued that extending Batson to strikes of individual jurors would effectively abolish the peremptory challenge. Id. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
82. See supra notes 50, 73 and accompanying text.
83. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. Edmonson, a construction worker, was injured when a Leesville
employee allowed a company truck to roll backward, pinning Edmonson against other construction
equipment. Id. Edmonson was a black man, and Leesville used two of its three peremptories in remov-
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qualified as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment." In another
opinion penned by Justice Kennedy, the majority held that, because peremptory challenges were allowed to exist as a result of government action," civil parties exercised peremptory challenges as government actors.8 6 Having overcome that hurdle, the Court easily concluded that racial discrimination in civil-trial selection harmed excluded jurors no less
than in criminal trials, and on that basis the prohibition of Powers was
extended to civil cases. 7
Although she joined in the Court's opinions in Batson and Powers,
Justice O'Connor dissented in Edmonson, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia." Troubled by the majority's state action
rationale, Justice O'Connor noted that attorneys for private litigants represent only their clients, not the government, 9 and the government is not
responsible for the private litigants' uses of peremptory challenges.'
During 1992, the Court placed the final piece of the race-based peremptory challenge puzzle with Georgia v. McCollum.9 Returning to the
criminal context, the McCollum Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when a criminal defendant's attorney uses peremptory
challenges for purposeful racial discrimination.92 The Court relied upon
Edmonson for the conclusions that criminal defendants engage in state
action when exercising peremptory challenges, and that the State has
standing to exert the constitutional rights of excluded jurors.93 The majority also addressed the effect of its holding upon peremptory challenges,

ing two blacks from the jury. Id. at 616-17. The resulting jury of 11 white persons and I black person
returned a verdict for Edmonson, but found him 80% contributorily negligent in causing his injuries.
Id. at 617.
84. See id. at 619; Broderick, supra note 45, at 401.
85. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622.
86. See id. at 621. In finding state action, the Court also relied upon the court's assistance in
exercising the peremptories, the jury system as a traditional function of government, and the fact that
the jury trial occurs in the courthouse. See id. at 622-23; Lynch, supra note 5, at 314.
87. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
88. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 641 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 644 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's premise was that, in order to constitute state action, private actions must comprise conduct which only the government traditionally engages in. Id. at 640 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because peremptory challenges are exercised by both
the government and private parties, state action could only occur where it was the government's use of
peremptory challenges which had resulted in discrimination. See id.
91. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
92. Id. at 2359. Three white defendants had been charged with the assault and battery of two
African Americans. Id. at 2351. During voir dire, the prosecutor sought an order that if the defense
struck jurors in a manner sufficient to support a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the trial
court would require a racially neutral explanation. Id. at 2351-52. The trial court, and ultimately the
Supreme Court of Georgia, denied the order. Id. at 2352.
93. Id. at 2356-57.
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concluding that the administration of justice was served by restricting
criminal defendants' use of peremptory challenges instead of allowing for
the possibility of race-based strikes.94
Ironically, McCollum represents the extension of Batson to the core of
the peremptory challenge's greatest protection: the criminal defendant.9 5
For over six centuries, defendants' exercise of peremptory challenges
existed relatively unaffected by the shifting legal contours in England and
America.' But in only six years the prohibition against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges expanded from protecting the equal protection rights of defendants, to honoring public interest ideals-even at the
risk of detriment to criminal defendants.' Whereas Batson was well
grounded in the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment,98 thus justifying
an imposition on the use of peremptory challenges, Powers, Edmonson,
and McCollum each continued to expand farther and farther away from
Batson's focus on protecting defendants against racial discrimination.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY

A. Gender Discrimination:A Legacy of Indifference
Although in 1879 the Court announced in Strauder v. West Virginia99
that racial discrimination was "practically a brand upon" blacks,"°° the
discriminatory treatment of women went untreated by the Court for many
more years. During most of its existence, the Constitution of the United
States has not been interpreted as commanding the equal treatment of men
and women; in fact, laws allowing unequal treatment have been the
norm. ' Even after the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution,
women were not allowed to vote, and in many states women could not

94. See id. at 2358.
95. See supratext accompanying notes 14, 16-17.
96. See supratext accompanying notes 9, 14, 16, 19.
97. Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 329-32. Zalesne and Zalesne explain that the Court's
shifting focus from litigating parties to the jurors reflects a willingness to honor communitarian goals,
even at the possible expense of criminal defendants. Id. The authors further note that although the civil
trial context traditionally has accommodated the rights of jurors and litigants, importing this accommodation to the criminal context was "unusual:' Id.
98. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
99. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
100. Id. at 308.
101. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute prohibiting the employment of women in factories for more than 10 hours daily); Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 176-77 (1874) (holding that although women were "persons" and "citizens" under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to vote was not a privilege of citizenship and therefore could be
denied to women). See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme
Court, 92 YALE LJ.913, 918-22 (1983) (discussing the pre-1970 equal protection doctrine and the
renewal of the women's movement during the 1960s and 1970s).
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enter into contracts, hold property, engage in litigation, or even control
their own money." 2
The first constitutional challenge to the unequal treatment of women
occurred in 1873 in Bradwell v. Illinois. 3 When Myra Bradwell was
denied the right to become a lawyer by the Illinois Bar and the Illinois
courts, she appealed to the United States Supreme Court under the Equal
Protection Clause.0 4 The Court, however, did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded her any unique protection. 5 In fact, it
would be another century before the Court reviewed gender-based classifications under any standard other than the rational basis applied to economic classifications."° As such, gender classifications were upheld, if at
all, as rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 7
B. Gender Discrimination:In Search of a Standard
Beginning in the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed,' 8 the Court began
viewing gender classifications with suspicion and an eye toward greater
protection under the Constitution."° In Reed, the Court reviewed a provision of the Idaho probate code giving preference to men over women
when more than one person sought appointment as the administrator of a

102. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162. (Then Professor) Ginsburg stated that, prior to the 1970s, "[tihe Constitution ... gave women the vote, but only that. In other respects, our fundamental instrument of
government was thought an empty cupboard for sex equality claims." Id. at 164.
103. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
104. See id. at 137-38. Bradwell argued that it was the right of every person to engage in the
lawful employment of their choice. Id. at 140 (Bradley, J., concurring). The Supreme Court of Illinois
had denied her request to join the state Bar, and therefore to practice law, because the common law of
the State was that only men were admitted to the Bar, and the legislature had never undertaken to alter
the common law. Id. (Bradley, J., concurring). In what has become a notorious concurrence, Justice
Bradley stated that the idea of a woman adopting a career outside the home, separate from her husband, was "repugnant" and against the "law of the Creator." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
105. See id. at 138-39. The fact that Bradwell's complaint was based upon gender discrimination,
and not racial discrimination, may have been fatal to her case. See Francisco Valdez, Diversity and
Discrimination in Our Midst: Musings on Constitutional Schizophrenia, Cultural Conflict, and
"Interculturalism" at the Threshold of a New Century, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 293, 315 n.105 (1993)
(observing that the day before it decided Bradwell, "the Court took pointed note of the fact that 'the
freedom of the slave race' was the overarching 'purpose' and 'foundation' of the [14th] Amendment").
106. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.21-.22 (4th ed.
1991).
107. See id.
108. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
109. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 14.22, at 739. In her article, Professor Freedman
explains that the "reemergence of the women's movement" in the 1960s brought about an environment
receptive to new "challenges to sex discrimination." Freedman, supra note 101, at 921. Two major
goals of this renewed movement were to allow women access to opportunities previously enjoyed only
by men, and to "obtain equal rewards for women" once those opportunities were attained. Id.
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decedent's estate."' Because of this statutory preference, no hearing was
required."' The State of Idaho argued that the preference made the appointment process less litigious and thus more efficient."' Although the
Court did not rule that gender was a "suspect" class like race,"' the
Court struck down the preference." 4

In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that giving "a
mandatory preference to members of either sex" merely for administrative
convenience was precisely the kind of "arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."".. The Court held that dissimilar
treatment of men and women was justified only where a rational relationship existed between a State objective and a difference between men and

women.16 In other words, a mere rational relationship was no longer
sufficient to justify a gender classification: Reed required a rational relationship plus a difference between men and women." 7
Reed stood in sharp contrast to other decisions by the Court granting
great deference to legislation decisionmaking under the "rational basis"
test."8 Ten years earlier, in Hoyt v. Florida,"9 the Court upheld a state
law exempting women from jury service, but allowing them to give up
their exempt status if they wished." In Hoyt and other cases,' the

Court had in fact justified its decision upon nothing more than adminis-

trative convenience." Similar to the Florida legislature in Hoyt,"3 the
State of Idaho in Reed had a persuasive argument that appointing adminis110. Reed, 404 U.S. at 72-73.
111. Id. at 76.
112. Id.
113. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that laws "which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect!' and therefore subject "to the most
rigid scrutiny").
114. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
115. Id. at 76.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (holding that the equal protection
safeguard is "offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective"). But see F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
(holding that "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike").
119. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
120. Id. at 58, 69.
121. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that as long as the legislative
belief was not totally irrational, Michigan could restrict all women who were not the wife or daughter
of a bar owner from being bartenders if the legislature believed that by doing so preventive measures
against moral and social problems could be reduced), overruled in partby Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 90
(1976).
122. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 14.21, at 738-39.
123. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 64.
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trators without requiring hearings was similarly convenient.24 However,
in rejecting the State's argument, the Court seemed to be signaling that a
new standard was being born. The reach of the new standard remained to
be seen.
Two years later, a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson"z held that gender-based classifications should receive strict scrutiny.2 6 Justice Brennan wrote that both the unfortunate history of sex discrimination in America, and the immutability of sex as a characteristic of
birth, compelled the elevation of gender to this heightened status. 2 The
legislation at issue denied women in the uniformed services the same dependent benefits as similarly-situated men.'28 Although a majority of the
Court struck down the legislation, 29 Justice Brennan's call for strict
scrutiny commanded only four votes, and has never been seriously reconsidered by the Court. 3 ' In fact, almost like a reaction to the Frontiero
plurality, the Court's next two gender-classification opinions seemed to
reiterate the views of some Justices that enough differences existed between race and gender that strict scrutiny would never extend to gender.
In Kahn v. Shevin,'' the Court held that a $500 property tax exemption given to widows, but not widowers, was justified because women
were more likely to face difficulties in the job market.' Similarly, in
Schlesinger v. Ballard,'33 the Court ruled that the beneficial treatment
afforded to women line officers by the U.S. Navy was warranted because
women were restricted from holding combat-related positions in the military.' 34 Kahn and Ballard were both situations where the Court upheld
laws which were seen as reasonably compensating women as a class for

124. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 14.22, at 739.
125. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
126. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 684-87 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 678-79 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was joined
by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall. Id. at 678 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart
concurred in the judgment, agreeing only that the statute invidiously discriminated between men and
women. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Powell, with Justice Blaclmun and Chief Justice
Burger, also concurred in the judgment, but specifically rejected the extension of strict scrutiny to sexbased classifications. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 691
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 678-79 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
130. See Freedman, supra note 101, at 917 n.13 (describing Frontieroas the "high water mark of
the effort to obtain strict scrutiny of sex classifications").
131. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
132. Id. at 352-54.
133. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
134. Id. at 508.
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past economic discrimination.'35 In both cases, these "benign classifications" would have been struck down had gender achieved strict scrutiny
36 Instead, the decisions seemed to mark a shift back
status in Frontiero.'
to the calculus of Reed-something more than a mere "rational relation37 something less than
ship," but, at least to five Justices in Frontiero,'
strict scrutiny.
During 1975 the Court decided two more gender-classification cases,
but without resolving the growing gender-based classification dilemma. In
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,"' the Court overturned a provision of the Social Security Act awarding survivor's benefits to widows, but not widowers, with dependent children.'39 Justice Brennan again wrote the opinion
of the Court, but unlike his Frontiero opinion, he made no attempt to invoke strict scrutiny."' In fact, Justice Brennan did not specifically mention any standard of review whatsoever.' Instead, Justice Brennan characterized Frontiero as teaching that "archaic and overbroad" gender classifications were unconstitutional.'42 Justice Brennan wrote that, like
Frontiero, the provision at issue in Wiesenfeld implied that earnings of
male workers were more important to a family than were the earnings of
female workers,'43 which made the provision "irrational."'" Simultaneously, Justice Brennan seemed to reject the paternalistic notions embraced in Kahn and Ballard, stating that the "recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose" did not foreclose an inquiry into the true underlying
purposes of a statute.'4 Whether because of his archaic and overbroad
characterization, the move away from strict scrutiny, or maybe because of
a perceived nod to the irrationality of the legislation,'" Justice Brennan's

135. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUToNAL LAw § 16-27, at 1566 (2d ed. 1988).
136. See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn, 416 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Professor Gunther coined probably the most well-known description of strict scrutiny
when he wrote " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). In the same article, Professor Gunther noted how the Warren Court had left a legacy of "new equal protection," which "embraced a rigid two-tier attitude" Id.
at 8.
137. See Freedman, supra note 101, at 917 n.13.
138. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
139. Id. at 638-39.
140. See id. at 642-53.

141. See id.
142. Id. at 643 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).

143. Id.
144. Id. at 651.

145. Id. at 648.
146. Justice Rehnquist filed a concurrence illuminating the disagreements which still belied the
question of a standard of review for gender classifications, and the remaining divisions over Frontiero.

See id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist wrote:

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Wiesenfeld opinion garnered the support of a unanimous Court. 47
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Stanton v. Stanton,"4 decided three49
months after Wiesenfeld, leaned more heavily upon the Reed approach.
Regarding child-support payments in divorce proceedings, Utah law defined the period of minority for males as extending to age twenty-one,
while minority for females ended at age eighteen.' The Utah Supreme
Court had upheld the statute based upon the "reasonable basis" that women tended to mature and marry earlier.' On the other hand, men should
be encouraged to get a good education before undertaking their primary
responsibility of providing a home.'52 In reversing the Utah court, the
Supreme Court specifically noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether gender was an inherently suspect class. 3 Instead, the Court found
that the distinction drawn between men and women contained nothing
rational." 4
Despite the Court's inability to precisely define a standard for reviewing gender-based classifications, the four years following Reed indicated
some growing consensus. The Court never backed down from Reed's
holding that rational basis review was insufficient. Likewise, Frontiero
made clear that gender and race were not constitutionally equivalent: a
majority of the Court could not agree to apply strict scrutiny.'55 Still,

I see no necessity for reaching the issue of whether the statute's purported discrimination
against female workers violates the Fifth Amendment as applied in Frontiero v. Richardson.... I would simply conclude, as does the Court... that the restriction of... benefits
to surviving mothers does not rationally serve any valid legislative purpose .... To my
mind, that should be the end of the matter.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
147. Justice Douglas did not take part in the consideration or decision. Id. at 653. Justice Powell
also included a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined. See id. at 654 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell believed the majority opinion went further than it had to, needing not to
engage in a discussion of whether the surviving parent elects to assume primary child care. Id. at 654
(Powell, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Powell concluded that the statutory scheme impermissibly discriminated, and was supported by "no legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 655 (Powell, J., concurring).
148. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
149. See supra notes 108-24 and accompanying text.
150. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 9.
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 17. The Court noted that, other than Arkansas, Utah was the only state which still fixed
the age for minority at 18 for women and 21 for men. Id. at 15. The Court also discussed that the days
of women primarily remaining at home to rear children, and only men being employed outside the
home, were long past. Id. at 14-15.
155. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the Court need not reach
the issue of whether classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny); id. at 688 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (stating that classifications based on sex
should be treated like classifications based on race and should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
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when Craig v. Boren'56 was decided in 1976, with five members of the
Court agreeing upon a standard of review previously unknown in genderclassification cases, the Court's discussion was heated.
C. Intermediate Scrutiny
In Craig, an Oklahoma statute allowed the sale of 3.2% beer to women aged eighteen or older, but not to men under age twenty-one.15 7 In
striking down the statute, Justice Brennan's majority opinion announced
that, based upon unnamed "previous cases," to withstand constitutional
challenge, gender classifications "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"' 5 -- so-called "intermediate" scrutiny. 59 This standard seemed to
split the difference between the "mere rationality" of legislation needed to
withstand rational-basis review and the "compelling purpose" required by
strict scrutiny."6°
In the process of overturning the Oklahoma statute and justifying an
intermediate tier of analysis, Justice Brennan mentioned that Reed and its
progeny had struck down laws based upon "overbroad generalizations"
and "outdated misconceptions."'6 Although concerned about the new
standard of review,' Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, believing the distinction drawn by the Oklahoma statute was not fairly and substantially related to the object of the legislation. 6 Dissenting, Chief Justice Burger tersely stated that making gender a disfavored classification
was without independent constitutional basis, and could not be justified
under Equal Protection Clause precedent."6 Justice Rehnquist's more
lengthy dissent focused on two aspects of the decision. First, he disagreed
that a special level of scrutiny could be justified where the group challenging the classification had not been the subject of historical discrimination. 6 Justice Rehnquist's second disagreement was with the new stan-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 191-92 n.1.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Freedman, supra note 101, at 926 n.57.

161. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
162. See id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed that Reed was the most relevant
precedent. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). He wrote that "candor compels the recognition that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we
address a gender-based classification." Id. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
164. See id.at 216-17 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
165. Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that, prior to Craig,
the Court had never applied heightened scrutiny to invalidate discrimination harmful to men, except
where a personal interest protected by the Constitution was involved. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
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dard itself: not found in the Equal Protection Clause, unsupported by
precedent, and "apparently com[ing] out of thin air."'"
D. The Post-CraigFlux
Since Craig, intermediate scrutiny has become a fixture on the constitutional landscape. Although this new level of scrutiny is seen in a variety
of forms, each is more or less true to the Craig standard.'67 The following cases highlight the more prominent intermediate scrutiny arguments
made by the post-Craig Court.
In Califano v. Goldfarb,6 ' decided shortly after Craig, the Court reviewed a provision of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance Program (OASDI) which granted greater survivors' benefits to
widows than widowers.'69 A plurality of the Court found the provision to
be no different than the OASDI provision at issue in Wiesenfeld, 7 ° and
invalidated the provision on those grounds.'' Four Justices dissented,
stating that the legislation should be upheld because it focused favorable
treatment upon a group that historically showed a high level of need."
The dissent further maintained that this case was not like Wiesenfeld,
where a separate OASDI provision totally excluded widowers from the
benefitted class.'73 They argued that the provision did not invidiously
discriminate, but in fact ameliorated the characteristic economic depression
of widows.'74
Nineteen days after Goldfarb, the Court decided Califano v. Web-

fact, Wiesenfeld, see supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text, also could have been seen as a case
of discrimination harmful to men, but the Court chose to construe the harm as occurring to female
workers. Id. at 219 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After Craig, several other cases, discussed in this
Note, ultimately saw the application of intermediate scrutiny for the benefit of men. See, e.g., infra
notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)); infra
notes 204-11 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982)); infra notes 228-39 and accompanying text (discussing J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1419).
166. Craig, 429 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. TRIBE, supra note 135, § 16-32, at 1601-02. Laurence Tribe catalogues the different techniques employed under the rubric of "intermediate scrutiny" into six general types: (1) assessing importance, (2) demanding close fit, (3) altering perspective by focusing on the challenged rule, (4) requiring current articulation, (5) limiting the use of afterthought, and (6) permitting rebuttal. Id. § 1632.
168. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
169. Id. at 201 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
170. Id. at 205 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); see also supra notes 138-47 and accompanying
text (discussing Wiesenfeld).
171. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 217 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 233 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 241 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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ster.'75 Under the Social Security Act, women retirees were granted
highei old-age benefits than similarly-situated men, based upon a more

generous mathematical formula for establishing the number of wage-earning years. 76 In a per curiam decision, the Court upheld the formula because it compensated women as a group for the effects of past discrimination."7 In upholding the formula, the Court cited Kahn and Ballard,'

again implying that classifications based upon paternalistic notions could
be justifiable. The same four Justices dissenting in Goldfarb7 ' concurred
in the Webster decision, although they were somewhat baffled by the
distinction between the two cases. 8 ' Surprisingly, Craig did not supply
the basis for the decisions in either Goldfarb or Webster, and the contrast
between the two cases signaled a continued lack of agreement on the
parameters of the intermediate standard.
The Court's decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney"' extended its ruling in Washington v. Davis"2 to gender classifications.'83 The
Court's 1976 decision in Davis held that statutes which resulted in racially
disparate impacts were unconstitutional only if a discriminatory purpose
could be proven.8 4 The Feeney Court reviewed a state statute which preferred all veterans who were applicants over all nonveterans."' Although6
acknowledging that the preference overwhelmingly advantaged men,"1
consistent with Davis, the Court upheld the legislation because it did not
purposefully discriminate on the basis of gender.'87 Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Feeney characterized the Craig standard as requiring "an

175. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
176. Id. at 314-16. In effect, the Social Security Act formula allowed women retirees to exclude
three more lower earning years than similarly-situated men, thus increasing the calculation of the average monthly wage upon which benefits were then based. Id.
177. Id. at 318, 321. In justifying its opinion, the Court wrote that the Social Security Act provision at issue was not a result of "overbroad" classifications of societal stereotypes. Id. at 317 (quoting
Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508). Instead, the Court agreed to uphold the provision because it redressed
society's historical disparate treatment of women. Id.
178. Id. at 318; see also supra notes 131-37 (discussing Kahn and Ballard).
179. See supra note 172. In Webster, Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurrence, specifically mentioning the Goldfarb dissent as his basis. Webster, 430 U.S. at 321 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
180. Webster, 430 U.S. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger wrote, "[w]hile I
am happy to concur in the Court's judgment, I find it somewhat difficult to distinguish the Social
Security provision upheld here from that struck down so recently in [Goldfarb]." Id. (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
181. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
182. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
183. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280.
184. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48.
185. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280.
186. Id. at 269.
187. Id. at 280.
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exceedingly persuasive justification" for preferring men over women."'
To what degree "exceedingly persuasive justification" differs from Craig's
actual language of "important governmental objectives"
and "substantially
9
related," ' 9 Justice Stewart did not elaborate.1 0
In Michael M. v. Superior Court,9 ' the Court upheld a California
statute making a man criminally liable for having sexual intercourse with a
women under age eighteen who was not his wife.'92 Thus, only men
were held criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse.'93 In a plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote that, where gender classifications
are not invidious but realistically reflect differences between the sexes, the
Court historically has upheld the statute.' 94 The plurality also found that
the California legislature's stated purpose of preventing illegitimate teen
pregnancies was due great deference.'95
To uphold the legislation, the plurality leaned heavily upon the rationale that women are uniquely situated to become pregnant-a deterrent to
intercourse not shared by men.' 96 As such, the criminal sanction of the
statute served to "equalize" the deterrents.' Regarding the discriminatory impact of the statute, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion stated that "a
gender classification based on clear differences between the sexes is not
invidious, and a legislative classification realistically based upon those
differences is not unconstitutional.' '9 In the concluding sentence of his
concurrence, Justice Stewart stated that the Constitution does not require
states to pretend that "demonstrable differences between men and women
do not really exist."' 99
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun wrote that his

188. Id. at 273.
189. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also supra text accompanying note 158 (articulating Justice
Brennan's test in Craig).
190. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 282. In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote that
the absolute veterans' preference statute showed purposeful discrimination. Id. at 282, 283 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall supported his conclusion by pointing out that the 70-year-old veterans'
preference system kept women in the same occupations traditionally held by women, thus perpetuating
the archaic assumptions about gender roles which the Court had held invalid in cases like Stanton and
Wiesenfeld. Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
192. Id. at 476 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
193. Id. (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 469 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (citing Webster, 430 U.S. at 313).
195. Id. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
196. Id. at 471 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 473 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring). Some commentators have argued that, in cases subsequent
to Michael M., Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stewart have expanded the concept of "real" sex
differences beyond only natural or biological differences to include "cultural behavior patterns" and
sometimes even legislation. See Freedman, supra note 101, at 944-45.
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affirmance was based on the Craig test as applied in Ballard, Wiesenfeld,
and Kahn,' three cases where the Court struggled with justifying pater-

nalistic bases for classifications. In the Michael M. dissent, Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall believed that the Court's opinion focused
too much on the issue of teenage pregnancy while allowing the discriminatory effect of the statute to go untouched. ° In the dissent's view, the
State had not fulfilled its burden of proving the importance of the objective and the substantial relationship of the classification.'a In the end,
the Craig test survived, but four votes had been cast for a distinction
based upon "clear differences between the sexes." 3 Although Justice
Blackmun concurred on different grounds, at a more general level of abstraction his concurrence appears to indicate that justifiable differences can
withstand intermediate scrutiny.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,' the Court invalidated a Mississippi statute which denied enrollment of men at a statesupported university. 5 In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor focused on the State's inability to provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for maintaining a single-sex nursing school.' The four dis-

200. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 483 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Freedman explains that the general approach of Justices Brennan and Marshall, and often Justice White, in sex discrimination cases was to strictly focus on
whether the classification at issue was "substantially related" to an "important government objective."
Freedman, supra note 101, at 949. Whether the underlying classification could be justified on a biological basis was immaterial to the Justices. Id.
203. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); id. at 478 (Stewart, J., con-

curring).
204. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Between Michael M. and Hogan, the Court decided Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). In Wengler, a Missouri statute provided death benefits to a
widow, but not to a widower unless he was mentally or physically handicapped or proved actual dependence on his wife's income. Id. at 144-45. In holding that the legislation was unconstitutional, id.
at 152, the Court distinguished its decision from Kahn by concluding that the Missouri statute discriminated against both men and women. Id. at 147. The Court also held that the State had the burden of
justifying the gender-based discrimination and establishing why a gender-neutral alternative would be
less effective. Id. at 151. Again, a mere claim of "administrative convenience" was not enough; there
had to be an offer of proof, Id.
205. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719-20, 733. The State of Mississippi argued that the purpose of the
statute, creating an all women's nursing school, was to "provid[e] the greatest practical range of educational opportunities" for women citizens, Id. at 721 (citation omitted). At the time of the Hogan decision, Mississippi University for Women was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the country.
Id. at 720. The state statute creating the college had become law in 1884 and the charter of the
school remained essentially unchanged until 1982 when Hogan was decided. Id. at 720 n.1.
206. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). Justice O'Connor stated
that the State had failed to establish that the stated objective of the statute was indeed the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification. Id. at 730. Even if that requirement had been met,
Justice O'Connor wrote, the State still would have to prove that the gender-based classification was
"substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory objective." Id.
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senting Justices believed that intermediate scrutiny was being inappropriately applied when it resulted in invalidating State efforts to expand
women's opportunities. 7 Dissenting separately, Justice Blackmun explained his concern that the "rigid rules" of sex discrimination were being
taken too far. 0 As a result, Justice Blackmun believed an important value-choice-was being sacrificed merely to achieve "needless conformity., 209
Besides being one of the last important gender discrimination cases
decided by the Court before 1994, Hogan provides two other interesting
perspectives. The first perspective is of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Hogan majority. In applying the Craig test, Justice O'Connor expertly
drags the State's justifications through the briar patch of prohibitions to
gender-based classifications (e.g., "archaic and stereotypic notions") collected by the Court over the previous decade. 0 While nothing about
Justice O'Connor's analysis is inaccurate, the sheer number of "briars"
indicates the variety of shapes into which intermediate scrutiny can be
molded to yield a desired conclusion.21
From another perspective, the Hogan dissent reminds us that the Court
has never abandoned the underlying premise of Reed that differences between men and women can justify their dissimilar treatment." The differences may be biological, as in Michael M.,"' or historical, as in
21216th
Webster, where the Court considered past
Ballard,"4 Kahn,1 s and
207. See id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 740
(Powell, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 724-25. For example, Justice O'Connor's application of the Craig test can be summarized as follows: "[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' " Id. at 724
(citations omitted). This is accomplished by "showing at least that the classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed ...[are] substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.' " Id. Later Justice O'Connor adds, "[care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions." Id. at 725. In
the end, what started as a two-step analysis has grown by at least one step, and the uncertainty of what
"exceedingly persuasive justification" means from Justice Stewart's opinion in Feeney persists. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
211. Not surprisingly, intermediate scrutiny may best be described as a standard allowing the
Justices to cast their votes upon nothing more than individual perceptions of the classification made,
and the governmental interest at stake, in each case. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 14.23, at
750.
212. Reed, 406 U.S. at 76; see also supra text accompanying notes 108-17 (discussing the Reed
Court's conclusion that for the Court to uphold a gender-based classification, there had to be a rational
relationship plus a difference between men and women).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 191-99.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32, 135-36.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
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discrimination against women in upholding gender-based classifications.
The single conclusion arising from these diverse perspectives is that intermediate scrutiny is uniquely flexible in equal protection analysis, especially compared to the narrow confines in which rational-basis review and
strict scrutiny operate. In the end, intermediate scrutiny allows for the
balancing of competing interests and the consideration of real differences,
but disallows classifications based upon stereotyped views of men and
women in society. The result is a viable and useful standard of equal
protection review filling a constitutional gap which existed for almost two
hundred years.
V.

WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE

A. Near Miss: Taylor v. Louisiana
During 1975, between Swain and Batson, and before the announce217
the Court decided Taylor v.
ment of intermediate scrutiny in Craig,
8
Louisiana," holding that the exclusion of women from juries denied a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." 9 The Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure provided that a woman could only be selected for
jury service if she had previously filed a written declaration indicating a
desire to serve.' The Court overturned the statute not on the basis of
the differing treatment of men and women, but because the Sixth Amendment commands juries be drawn from venires representative of the community.21
In reviewing the precedent supporting the Sixth Amendment's "fair
cross section" requirement tm the Court discussed the value of having
women on juries.' The Court noted that the presence of women helps

217. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
218. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
219. Id. at 537. As a result of the state statute, only 10% of the citizens on the "jury wheel" were
women, even though the parish in which Taylor was being tried was composed of 53% women. Id. at
524. In fact, the venire drawn for Taylor's case totaled 175 men and no women. Id.

220. Id. at 523.
221. Id. at 537.
222. Id. at 526-31.
223. Id. at 530-32. The exclusion of women from juries was yet another tradition adopted from
our English heritage.
In England there was one exception to the rule that only males could serve as jurors. If a
woman pleaded pregnancy a writ de ventre inspiciendo was allowed in two situations: (1) if
she was subject to capital punishment or (2) if a widow sought postponement of the disposition of her husband's estate until the birth of a child. A writ de ventre inspiciendo permitted the use of a jury of matrons to examine the woman to determine the question of
pregnancy. Even when a jury of matrons was used, however, the examination was in the
presence of twelve men, who also comprised part of the jury in such cases.
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insure the "diffused impartiality" of juries because women are "sufficiently
numerous and distinct from men. 22 4 The Court further noted that a community, and by implication a jury, composed solely of men or women is
distinctly different in quality and character from a community containing
members from both groups.2" The Court also cited with approval studies
of women jurors' performance which concluded that women bring to
juries their own perspectives and values which influence both the jury's
deliberation and verdict. 2 6 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional because the systematic exclusion of women by the State prevented the formation of a fair jury. 7 Men and women were to be treated the same, and the foundation for that conclusion was
firmly grounded in recognizing and embracing the differences between
men and women.
B. Collision: J.E.B. v. Alabama
The Court never faced the direct collision of the independent doctrines
of intermediate scrutiny and limited peremptory challenges until the 1994
term. In J.E.B.,2 ' the State of Alabama had filed suit against the defendant seeking paternity and child support.22 9 Of the twelve men and twenty-four women comprising the venire, the State used nine of twelve peremptory challenges to strike men; similarly, the defense used all but one
strike to dismiss women.23 As a result, all the selected jurors were wom" ' J.E.B. objected to how the State used its challenges, but the trial
en.23
court upheld the State's capacity to make gender-based strikes.3 2 The
jury found J.E.B. to be the biological father, and the trial court entered an
order against the defendant directing child support payments."
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Blackmun stated that the cases
further defining Batson-although addressing racial discrimination-apply

Grace E.W. Taylor, Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 224, 224-25 (1959) (citing
Willoughby's Case, Cro. Eliz. 566, 78 Eng. Rep. 811 (K.B. 1597)). (Now Professor) Taylor's Note is
also interesting for its discussion of the mounting pressure on the Florida legislature to require compulsory jury service for women. See id. at 224-31.
224. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
225. Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94).
226. Id. at 532 n.12 (citing Wallace M. Rudolph, Women on Juries-Voluntary or Compulsory?,
44 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc. 206 (1961); 55 J. Soc. & Soc. RFS. 442 (1971); 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PsyCHOL. 267 (1973); 19 SocIoMETRy 3 (1956)).
227. Id. at 538.
228. 114 S. Ct. at 1419.
229. Id. at 1421.
230. Id. at 1421-22.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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equally to gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.23 4

Justice Blackmun described as "axiomatic" that intentional gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.235 Later in the opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that Taylor,236 even though grounded in the Sixth
Amendment, was consistent with the gender-based heightened scrutiny
applied since Reed. 7 Justice Blackmun described the core of the issue
in J.E.B. as being whether exercising peremptory challenges based on
gender stereotypes substantially helped a party secure a fair jury.23 Concluding that the State's gender-based strikes were reminiscent of the arguments once used to exclude women from jury service, the Court reversed the decision against J.E.B
C. Sorting Through the Rubble
Although deceptively straightforward, Justice Blackmun's opinion
assumes a level of similarity between race and gender beyond any the
Court has ever announced. For example, the blunt statement that Batson
and its progeny apply equally to gender discrimination2 was never conceded in the Batson line of cases,24 and in fact was implicitly rejected
by Justice O'Connor as recently as 1991 in Hernandez v. New York. 242 In
a concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor wrote in
Hernandez that equal protection precedent established that peremptory
strikes constitute a Batson violation only if the prosecutor struck a juror
because of race.243
Similarly, as discussed in part IV of this Note, supra, Justice

234. Id. at 1421. In reaction to this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent that because
race lies at the core of Batson, and there are "sufficient differences between race and gender discrimination," the Constitution did not require the result reached by the majority. Id. at 1434-36 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1422.
236. See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.
237. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
238. Id. at 1425-26.
239. Id. at 1426, 1430.
240. Id. at 1421.
241. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
242. 500 U.S. 352 (1991). In Hernandez, a criminal defendant sought review of a prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges excluding four Latino potential jurors. Id. at 355-56. The prosecutor explained that two of the potential jurors, who were bilingual, had been excluded because he was unsure
whether they would accept the official interpreter's version of what was said by Spanish-speaking
witnesses. Id. at 356. The defendant argued that Spanish-language ability bore such a close relation to
race that exercising peremptory challenges to exclude Spanish-speakers was a Batson violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court upheld the New York Court of Appeals' decision, finding that the prosecutor's basis for exercising the peremptory challenges was race-neutral, and
therefore did not violate Batson. Id. at 372.
243. Id. at 373 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991)).
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Blackmun's "axiom" that intentional gender discrimination violates the
245 and WebEqual Protection Clause is mistaken. In Kahn,24 Ballard,
246
ster, a majority of the Court upheld gender-based classifications which
took into account past discrimination against women.247 Additionally, a
plurality of the Court in Michael M. upheld a statute discriminating between men and women, concluding that classifications based upon clear
differences were neither invidious nor unconstitutional. 2' Notably, Justice Blackmun specially concurred in Michael M., based not upon the
"clear differences" rationale, but on the Court's previous applications of
249
heightened scrutiny in Kahn, Ballard, and Webster.
Equally problematic in J.E.B. is the majority's invocation of Taylor. In
guaranteeing women the right to jury participation, Taylor was clearly
decided upon differences between men and women," 0 and the perspectives and values each uniquely supply to the deliberation and result of jury
proceedings."
The nonfungibility of men and women noted in
Taylor2 creates a paradox Justice Blackmun ignores: if men and women
indeed bring a unique perspective to the jury, a litigant's desire to eliminate extreme viewpoints based on those perspectives is by definition not a
stereotype. In her J.E.B. concurrence, Justice O'Connor hints at this paradox when she notes that, while the Constitution is intolerant of racial
discrimination, we all know that race and gender matterY3
This paradox, together with the recognition that race and gender can
make a difference, represent the collision of intermediate scrutiny and
peremptory challenges which the J.E.B. majority fails to address. Contrary
to Justice Blackmun's characterizations, 54 the jurisprudence of race is
not interchangeable with the jurisprudence of gender. The Court clearly

244. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32, 135-36.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
247. See supra text accompanying note 177. Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote in his J.E.B. dissent that "[t]he two sexes differ, both biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experience. It is not
merely 'stereotyping' to say that these differences may produce a difference in outlook which is
brought to the jury room." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 191-99.
249. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 483 (Blackmun, J., concurring); supra text accompanying note 200.
250. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-32; supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
251. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531-32; supra text accompanying note 225.
252. 419 U.S. at 531 (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94).

253. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurrence is relatively narrow, and she explains that the "blow against gender discrimination is not costless." Id. at
1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor later recounts her dissent in Edmonson, reiterating
that the extension of Batson to the civil arena was a mistake by the Court. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). As a result, she concludes that the J.E.B. decision should be constrained to state action.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
254. See id. at 1421; supra text accompanying note 234.
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decided in Frontieross that gender and race differ enough that gender
classifications are not measured against a strict scrutiny standard2 56 In
fact, Justice O'Connor might say that applying intermediate scrutiny to
gender discrimination reflects our uspicion of gender classifications, but
our intolerance is reserved for race-based classifications.as
VI. AFTER WORLDS COLLIDE

A. Analysis
A more faithful adherence to Batson and the jurisprudence of intermediate scrutiny would have resulted in a fundamentally different, and likely
less divisive, conclusion in J.E.B. Initially, it is important to accept that
race and gender are different methods of classification. This is perhaps
best illustrated in our equal protection jurisprudence, in which race and
gender classifications are treated so differently: not by accident, indecision, or judicial gloss, but by explicit decision'
The next important consideration is that gender classifications are less
likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause than are racial classifications.
As the Court summarized in Webster, what offends equal protection are
invidious classifications, especially those based upon gender-role stereotypes.a 9 In contrast, gender classifications which advance important governmental objectives are allowed to stand, including classifications based
upon real gender differences or compensation for past discrimination.'
The Court has lacked consensus on the extent to which eradicating
past discrimination represents an important governmental objective."'
However, the command of the Sixth Amendment to an "impartial
jury" is clearly of such importance. And in achieving this objective, as
the Court stated more than a century ago, the peremptory challenge is "es-

255. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
256. See supra text accompanying note 130.

257. See supra text accompanying note 253.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30 & note 128. Professor Mayfield argues that
Batson's protections only extend to groups previously identified as being suspect or groups that should
be classified as suspect. Bonnie L. Mayfield, Batson and Groups Other Than Blacks: A Strict Scrutiny
Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 377, 404 (1988). Professor Mayfield concluded in the same article

that the Supreme Court had shown no inclination to expand the Batson-protected classifications beyond the strict scrutiny classifications. Id. at 416.
259. See Webster, 430 U.S. at 317; supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
260. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317.
261. Compare Goldfarb, supratext accompanying notes 168-74, with Webster, supra text accom-

panying notes 175-79 (representing opposite decisions in two factually similar cases, decided within
three weeks of each other, where the Court was faced with federal statute provisions providing less
survivors benefits to widowers than widows).
262. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

'
sential to the fairness of trial by jury."263
Admittedly, the analysis cannot stop here. Batson and its progeny
certainly stand for the proposition that the peremptory challenge has been
weakened.2" In considering the proper application of these cases to gender classifications, a return to the core of Batson itself is both proper and
instructive.
Underlying Batson is a balancing of the dictates of equal protection
against the value of peremptory challenges.265 In its equal protection
analysis, Batson focused solely on racial discrimination, 2" concluding
that the Equal Protection Clause is superior to peremptory challenges. 7
But in consciously refraining from overruling Swain's support for peremptory challenges,26 the Batson majority stated that peremptories occupy an "important position" in trial procedures and contribute to the
administration of justice.269 Moreover, the majority patently rejected Justice Marshall's proposition that peremptory challenges be totally abolished. In the end, Batson concluded that the history and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect citizens from racial discrimination,271 and to the extent peremptory challenges threatened that indisputable command, peremptories must yield. 72 While the effect of this conclusion was to weaken the historical deference to peremptory challenges,
Batson was not a statement of opposition to peremptory challenges. Instead, Batson was a decision reaffirming the constitutional command for

263. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quoted in Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)). More recently the Court has written that the right to a fair trial is "the most
fundamental of all freedoms [and] must be maintained at all costs." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965).
264. See Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 13, at 332.
265. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In balancing these two factors,
the majorities in Batson and J.E.B. do not address all of the costs associated with diminished peremptory challenges. In Batson, Justice Powell claimed that no serious administrative burdens would result
from the Court's decision. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. Subsequent literature has shown Justice Powell's
prediction to be inaccurate. See Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to EradicateInvidious Discriminationfrom Jury Selection, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 636-37 (1994). Justice O'Connor notes in her J.E.B. concurrence that Batson
"mini-hearings" are now routine in both state and federal courtrooms, and Batson appeals have "proliferated." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concludes that the cost
will fall hardest upon the criminal defendant, though, because voir dire cannot fill the gap left by the
loss of unexplained peremptory challenges. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-98.
267. Id. at 98-99; J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
268. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n.25.
269. Id. at 98-99.
270. Id. at 99 n.22; see also supra note 66 (quoting Justice Marshall's proposition, and the Batson
majority's rejection).
271. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-96; supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
272. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99.
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racial equality.
Like Batson, J.E.B. also requires balancing the commands of equal
protection against the value of peremptory challenges. Yet, the commands
of equal protection are not as unyielding in cases of gender classifications
as with racial classifications. The failure to incorporate this distinction is
the critical flaw of the J.E.B. opinion.
B. A Better World
Justice Blackmun's solution in J.E.B. was to import the Batson test
without acknowledging the fundamental constitutional distinction between
race and gender.27 Just as gender classifications are a lesser burden to
the Equal Protection Clause than are racial classifications, gender classifications should place a lesser burden on peremptory challenges. Because
gender is a favored classification, it would be incorrect to allow peremptory challenges to remain unfettered; but wholesale application of Batson
equally distorts the history of gender-based classifications and ignores the
rule of stare decisisY 4
Undoubtedly, the Court could have fashioned a test in J.E.B. which
balanced the continuing importance of peremptory challenges and the
lesser commands of the Equal Protection Clause regarding gender classifications. Even appropriate changes to the Batson test itself could have
achieved this result. For example, instead of allowing evidence of disproportionate impact to establish discriminatory intent, as allowed in
Batson,275 a gender-based test could require proof of actual intent to discriminate based upon "archaic or overbroad generalizations" or societal
role-typing.276 In response, a litigant accused of discriminatively using
peremptories would receive an opportunity to establish that the gender
classifications made, if any, were based upon "clear differences," 27 important governmental objectives,2 7 8 or overcoming past
discrimination2 9 Given the great malleability of the intermediate scruti-

273. See supra text accompanying notes 234-43.
274. In the recent case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), Justice O'Connor
discussed the rule of law and the importance of stare decisis. Writing for the plurality, Justice
O'Connor stated that "[t]he obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.... Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." Id.
at 2808 (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).
275. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45, 182-87.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 191-99.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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ny standard,28 a variety of similar tests were available to the J.E.B. majority. No matter which test had been selected, the most important feature
would have been that it was based upon intermediate scrutiny and not
upon strict scrutiny.
VII. CONCLUSION
J.E.B. v. Alabama represents an infrequent intersection in constitutional law where two important and previously independent doctrines must be
weaved into one workable solution. Where the doctrines are inherently in
competition, the Court should take extra care in forming an opinion and
developing a test which reflects the true nature of the history and current
understanding of each doctrine. The Court's solution in J.E.B. failed to
apply the jurisprudence of intermediate scrutiny in questioning the degree
to which equal protection forbids gender-based uses of peremptory challenges. Instead, the Court indiscriminately applied the Batson test, which
reflected a different constitutional standard and balanced a set of competing values inapposite to gender-based classifications.
The result in J.E.B. distorts the Court's two decades of struggle to
develop an intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny which rejects
stereotyped gender roles, while it recognizes real differences between men
and women. Additionally, by applying the Batson standard to gender
classifications, J.E.B. strikes a crucial blow to the continued viability of
peremptory challenges. By declining to construct a test reflecting the constitutional differences between race and gender, J.E.B. threatens all
litigants' abilities to empanel an unbiased jury.
In contrast, a standard more faithful to intermediate scrutiny precedent
would have strengthened the ability of the courts to eradicate gender-based
discrimination without sacrificing the confidence in the jury system which
peremptory challenges have provided for more than six centuries. The
challenge before the Court in a post-J.E.B. world is to protect each
litigant's day in court and preserve the public confidence in the jury system. The blind pursuit of conformity is not the path to either of these
goals.

280. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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